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In this paper, the effects  of monetary  policy are examined  in a simple convex  model with
endogenous  groMh.  In an economy  with a reserve  requirement,  monetary  policy has  growth-
rate effects. I compare  quantitatively  the effect that changes  in money  growth cum inflation
have on growth, on the welfafe costs  of inflation, and on seignorage  revenue,  contrasting  the
results  with a reserve  requirement  with other types  of distortions considered  in the literature.
I show that the inflation rate affects  the growth rate in a model with reserve  requirements.
More specifically, the growth-rate  effects  are larger in a model with reJerve  requirements  than
previous estinates in which other distortions are present. Not surprisingly, larger growth-rate
effects  translate  into larger estimates  of the welfare costs  of inflation.  Indeed,  the welfare
costs  of moderate  inllations are moderately  higher than previous estimates. Finally, I show
that if seignorage  revenue  is a small contributor to total tax revenues  then the growth-rate
effects  more than offset a decline  in the inflation rate or reserve  requirements.
The author  thanks  Scott Freenran,  Rik Hafer, Greg Hufftnan, Evan Koenig, Firur Kydland, Roy
Ruffin, and Catlos Zaruz.aga  for helpful comments  on earlier drafts of this paper. The views
expressed  in this papers  do not necessarily  reflect those  of the Federal  Reserve  Bank of Dallas nor the
Board of Govemors  of the Federal  Reserve  Svstem.l.  Introduction
The convex  model of endogenous  growth provides an interesting  laboratory  for studying  the
effects  of macroeconomic  policy and growth.  Larry Jones  and Rodolfo Manuelli (1990)  atgue  that
differences  in policy can explain differences  in growth across  countries. Robert  King and Sergio
Rebelo  (1990)  calibrated  a simple model with endogenous  growth to quantify the effects  that tax
policies have  on economic  growth, thereby  characterizing  persistent  differences  in growth rates  across
countries. Peter  Ireland (19%) asls about  the goverrunent  budget  consequences  of a change  in
income  tax rates. Which dominates  the present  value of tex revenues,  the lower tax rate or the faster
growing tax base? Ireland estimates  that the present  value of tax revenues  rises when the govemment
lowers  the'income  tax rate  from 2O%  to 15%  using  the  King-Rebelo  model.
Tax and  trade  policies have received  a great  deal of attention. A reasonable  question  is
whether  monetary  policy has  a significant role in explaining movements  in growth rates. Because  of
the statistical  regularity professed  to exist between  money growth and output growth, one would
presume  that much has  been  written on the subject. However, only a few studies  have  examined  the
effects  of monetary  policy  on growth.
What effect do changes  in money  growth cum inflation have on output growth? The answer
has evolved  quite a bit over the years. For many years, the dominant  empirical relationship  guiding
empirical  work was  the  Phillips  curye. James  Tobin (1965)  explains  the  positive  conelation  between
money growh  and output growth in a general  equilibrium model in which money  and capital are
substitutes.  The "Tobin  effect"  notes  that  a higher  inflation  rate  lowers  the  retum  bn money  balances,
causing  agents  to trade  for the  higher  yielding  capital. In contrast,  Milton Friedman  (1977)  questions
the  existence  of positive  correlation,  interpreting  evidence  from several  countries  as  indicating  a weak
negative  relationship  between  inflation  and  output  growth.r Subsequently,  theory  sought  to explain
I See  also,  evidence  supplied  by Roger  Kormendi  and  Philip  Meguire  (1985).why such a negative  relationship  would exist.  Alan Stocknan (1981) and  Jeremy  Greenwood  and
Greg Hufftnan (1987) construct  models  in which agents  hold money  to satisfy a cash-in-advance
constraint. In these  model economies,  consumption  and leisure are gross  substitutes. Hence,  as the
inflation rate increases,  the return on money  falls, inducing  agents  to consume  more leisure and  thus,
lowering the amount  of output.
Theory matches  the key qualitative  aspects  in the data. However, estjmates  of the effects  of
monetary  policy on growth and welfare suggest  that changes  in money  growth cum inflation are
small.2 Recently, Larry Jones  and Rodolfo Manuelli (1993) have  examined  the role of monetary
policy in an endogenous  growth model.  In a model with no distortions, Jones  and Manuelli show that
the growth rate is independent  of changes  in money  growth.  The authors  recognize  that either
introducing distortions into the model or letting the production  technology  have  increasing  retums to
scale  would generate  a negative  correlation  between  money  growth and output growth.  Jones  and
Manuelli quantify the effect of monetary  policy in a setting  with nominal depreciation  allowances.
They esthnate  that inflation (such  as l0 %) has a negligible effect on the rate of growth (less  dnn 0. 1
percentage  point). Correspondingly,  the  welfare  costs  of moderate  inflations  are  about  0.5% of GNP.
In a model with increasing  returns to scale,  Jones  and Manuelli find that the rate of growth increases
by 0.  1 percentage  point and  the  welfare  cost  ribes  to 1.5  % of GNP.  Thus,  the  estimates  of the
welfare costs  of inflation are slightly higher for models  with a potential growth-rate  effect than those
generated  by Thomas  Cooley  and  Gary  Hansen  (1989). In a stationary  model  economy,  Cooley  and
Hansen  find that  the  welfare  costs  of a 10%  inflation  rate  is 0.15  % of consumption.
In another  approach,  Paul Gomme  (1993) examines  the effects  of money  growth in a model in
'l The relationship  between  changes  in the rate of growth and welfare are made  clear in Robert
Lucas'  (1987)  experiments.  Lucas  estimates  that  in an  economy  witha3%  growth  rate,  consumption
would have  to increase  by 17% to make  the agent  as well off as if the economy's  growth rate was
4%.which agents  buy both physical and human  capital. In the Gomme  paper, agents  face  a cash-in-
advance  constraint. An increase  money  growth taxes  the consunption good and lowers the return to
labor.  Similar to Greenwood  and Hufftnan, agents  intratemporally  substitute  for the credit good,
leisure, which reduces  the accumulation  of human  capital, thereby  permanently  lowering the rate of
growth.  Interestingly, Gomme  estimates  the welfare costs  of moderate  inflation to be an order of
magnitude  smaller than estimates  in Cooley and  Hansen,  despite  the growth-rate  effect.  Thus, despite
models  that find inverse relationships  between  money  growth and output growth, the exercises  suggest
that quantitatively, moderate  rates  of inflation do not substantially  afTect  the rate of growth or have
significant welfare costs.
In this paper, I ask whether  other distortions can generate  results  in which monetary  policy
has  quantitatively  larger effects  on the growth rate and welfare.  Specifically, I ask whether
introducing a reserve  requirement  into an endogenous  growth model is sufficient for anticipated
moneary policy actions to have larger effects  on the rate of growth, and, correspondingly  on the
welfare costs  of inflation.  Jones  and Manuelli note reserve  requirements  are another  distortion that
would result in inflation having growth effects  qualitatively similar to the introduction of nominal
depreciation  allowances. The contribution of this paper  is to quantify the effects  of monetary  policy
in a model economy  with reserve  requirements. The investigation  seems  appropriate  since  reserve
requirements  are policy in many countries. Furthermore,  the growth-rate  effect is in line with the
correlations  reported  in Gomme. In particular,  Gomme  reports  the  correlation  between  the inflation
rate  and  output  growth  for 82 countries  in a histogram.  The  central  tendency  is in the  4.2 to -0.4
range.
In this setup,  banks  are  forced  to hold a ftaction  of their  deposits  in the form of fiat money.
This reserve  requirement  implies  that  money  is a "forced"  complement  to intermediated  capital,  in the
sense  that banks  can only acquire  more intermediated  capital (for a given increase  in deposits)  by alsogetting more fiat money. This distinction means  that monetary  policy affects  the accumulation  of
intermediated  capital.  Insofar as some  fraction of capital is inlermediated,  a reserve  requirement  ratio
crowds out capital formation.  Money growth cum inflation makes  intermediated  capital less  atFactive
because  the reserve  balances  are taxed  at a higher rate, thus lowering the retum on competitively
provided deposits. The tax incidenc€  on intermediated  capital provides a  direct channel  though
which monetary  policy actions  can affect the return on capital.  As a minor point, the model economy
permits one to consider  changes  in both monetary  policy instruments--the  reserve  requirement  ratio
and the rate of money  growth--as  it affects  the retum on deposits.
Clearly, the financial intermediary  introduced  into this environment  plays a crucial role.  The
reserve  requirement  is applied  egainst  d€posits  at a bank.  Economies  with a reserve  requiranent have
been  studied  by Fama  (1980),  Romer  (1985),  and  Freeman  (1987). Because  there  is no uncertainty  in
this environment,  the emphasis  is on reserve  requirements  as a tax on intermediation. Some
investrnent  projects  are large enough  that agents  must pool their savings. This illiquidity motivates
intermediation. Hence,  the tax on intermediation  is more accurately  represented  as a tix  on
intermediated  capital.  The inflation tax operates  in a similar way.  By taxing money  holdings, raising
the inflation tax makes  deposits  less  attractive  and inhibits capital accumulation. Thus, raising either
reserve  requirements  or the inflation rate results  in slower growth by discouraging  agents  from buying
intermediated  capital.  The model is the laboratory  tool for quantifuing the effects  of these  policy
interventions. By varying the inflation rate and reserve  requirements,  it is possible  to study the
effects  on growth,  welfare,  and  seignorage  revenue.  As such,  the  analysis  builds  on work by Cooley
and Hansen,  Jones  and Manuelli, and Gomme,
The results  of these  experiments  are easily summarized. In the model economy  with reserve
requirements,  the  computational  experiments  indicate  that  the  growth-rate  effects  of changes  in
monetary  policy are  relatively  large. The  parnmeter  settings  are  the  same  as  in the  literature,implying that the changes  in the inflation rate have  a larger effect on the 'after-tax" return on capital
than when the other distortions are used. For example,  the case  in which the inflation rate falls from
lO% to O% results  in the rate of output growth increasing  by about  0.4 percentage  points and the
welfare costs  of z l0%  inflation rate is 3.4  % of consumption. The point is that the reserve
requirement  seerns  to be a larger distortion, so that monetary  policy would appear  to have  nontrivial
effects  on output growth and welfare.  This estimate  may seem  quite large, especially  since  the
correlation between  the inflation rate and output growth is about -0.2 for the united states. A
decrease  in the elasticity of intertemporal  substitution  reduces  the growth-rate  effect.  Indeed,  with the
elasticity of substitution  parameter  set equal  to 0.20, the inflation rate experiment  adds  only 0.17
percentage  points to the rate of output growth.  With smaller estimates  of the growth-rate  effects,  the
welfare gains assoeiated  with lowering the inflation rate from l07o to o% arc o.7% of consumption,
comparable  to the findings presented  in Jones  and  Manuelli.
I also consider  the effects  that monetary  policy actions  have  on revenue. The findings
indicate that the present  value of seignorage  revenue  falls in response  to lowering either the inflation
rate or the reserve  requirement. For the benchmark  parameter  setting, total revenue--the  sum of
income  tax revenue  and seignorage  revenue--rises  for small changes  in either the inflation rate or
reserve  requirement. However, for the high elasticity of substitution  setting, total revenues  decline
with any decrease  in the monetary  policy instruments. Monetary policy simpty does  not induce
enough  growth  to offset  the  lower  iax rate. In a setting  in which  intermediated  capital  is a small
fraction of total capital, changes  in the monetary  policy instruments  have a very siriall effect on the
overall tax rate.  Computational  experiments  with this version of the model economy  indicate  that
even  with small  growth-rate  effects,  the  present  value  of government  revenues  rises. This finding
suggests  that  in economies  with little intermediated  capital  relative  to the  total  stock,  then  total
govenrment  revenues  are inversely related  to movements  in the monetary  policy instruments  ratherthan  directly  related.
The outline for the paper  is as follows:  Section  2 describes  the model and derives  the main
theoretical  results. The calibration of the model and results  from the computational  experiments  with
regard  to the growth-rate responses  are reported  in Section  3.  Sections  4 and 5 examine  the welfare
effects  and seignorage  revenue  impacts,  respectively. Section  6 offers a brief summary.
2. The Model
The economic  environment  consists  of three  types  of decisionmakers:  firms, households,  and
banks. In each  period, firms maximize  profits in a perfectly competitive  merkets  for both inputs and
outputs. Firms  produce  a single  consumption  good,  Y,, where  t = 0, 1,2,  .., indexes  periods.
Production  is accomplished  using a common-knowledge  technology,  represented  by
(l) Y,:  AIQ, A>0,
where K denotes  capital.  Equation  (1) specifies  a constant-returns  technology  in which the quantity K
is interpreted  as a composite  of both physical and human  capital.3 The firm pays the rental price, q,
for the composite  input and sells the ouput at the price, p.  Both p and q are measured  in units of fiat
money. King and  Rebelo  (1990)  and  Rebelo  (1991)  explore  the  properties  of this linear  production
technology. The authors  show that the linear production  function captures  mostly all the long-run
policy implications of more general  convex  models  of endogenous  growth in which the accumulation
of multiple  capital  goods  is considered  explicitly.
Over  time, capital  depreciates  at the  rate  6 and  is expanded  by investment  X.  I assume  that
the consumption  good is costlessly  transformed  into the capital good at a one-for-one  rate.  Thus, the
law of motion  for capital  is expressed  as
3  The  linear  specification  assumes  that  these  two forms  of disaggregated  capital  are  perfect
substitutes  in production. Barro  (1990)  shows  that  each  type  of capital  can  have  decreasing  rehrrns
alone,  but constant  returns  in both  applied  together.@  I(*1 = (l-6)I(  + X,.
Alt capital  must be intermediated. I assume  that there is a minimum investment  size, rc,.a  I further
assume  that the minimum investment  size is a linear function of ou@ut.s This assumption  guarantees
that the srnall saver  does  not outgrow the need  for intermediation  services.
Households  in this model economy  are atomistic, infinitely lived with preferences  described
by the time sepamble  CES utility  function
(3) 
6  -!-o  -1
rr = \-  nt  "E
?=o  r-  o
where c is the quantity of the consumption  good, 0 <  p  <  I is the time rate of preference,  and o >
0 where 1/o is the elasticity of intertemporal  substitution. Population  is assumed  constant  such  that
there is no aggregation  bias in treating movements  in per-capita  quantities  as  equal  to movements  in
aggregate  quantities.
In each  period t, the government  makes  a lump-sum  transfer equal  to Gr units worth of the
consumption  good. Initially,  I assume  that seignorage  revenue  is the only means  of financing  the
trarufer.  The govemment  budget  constraint,  therefore, is
(4)  Q:  (M,-M,_r)/p.
This trarufer, combined  with income  and the gross return on goods  deposited  at banks, is used  by
households  to purchase  the consumption  good and deposits  that will be carried over into the next
period. Formally,  the  household's  date  t budget  constraint  is
(5)  RrD,  + Gr  =  cr *  D,+r,
" This illiquidity assumption  is adapted  from John  Bryant  and  Neil Wallace  (1980)  and  Scott
Freeman  (1987),  who employs  this technology  in stationary  economies  to generate  the  need  for
financial  intermediation.  Essentially,  the  primitive  intermediary  serves  a pooling  function  for small
savers.
5 This assumption may be motivated by appeal to some information  frictions that keep banks
from making loans  larger  than some  fraction of output.where Dr denotes  the deposits  (measured  in units of the consumption  good) carried over ftom date  t-l
to date t, and R. is the gross  rate of retum on these  deposits.
In addition, the representative  household  faces  a terminal constraint. Consistent  with this
terminal constraint  is the notion that the household  can sell claims against  future deposits,  but never  at
a value greater  than can be repaid. The terminal constraint  is
(6) 
rn  l ]im"*lfr]  =0,
which guarantees  that the period budget  constraints  (5) can be combined  into an infinite horizon,
present  value budget constraint. Since  the marginel utility  of mnsumption goes  to infinity as
consumption  goes  to zero, an interior solution for c, and Q*,  is guaranteed. Consumers  take  the
initial positive  quantity  deposits,  Do,  and  the  sequences  {r,}]-0,  {t"tJ]=o, {c,}]_0, and  {&}]_0, as
given when maximizing (3) subject  to (5) and (6).
The bank accepts  deposits,  using the proceeds  to purchase  real money  balances  and  capital.
Capital is then rented  to firms.  Banks  maximize profits, assuming  barking services  are provided
costlessly. The bank is operating  in a competitive  environment. Every unit of capital retums A  +
(1-d)  units  of the  consumption  good  in the  next  period. Money  is held  by banla  to meet  a reserve
requirement,  denoted  7r. The  bank  takes  the  sequences  {&}l=o ana  {fJi_o  ," given  when
maximizing  profits.
The  govenunent  is assumed  to have  cornmitted  itself  to a sequence  of {1J:=0, {M}]_0, tating
the sequence  of interest  rates  as given.  The government  takes  the initial stock of dEposits,  Do, and
the  sequence  of deposits  and  price  level, {D,}*_o  and  {pJi=',  as  given. The  date  t price  level  is
determined  by the  money  market  equilibrium  condition:
(7)  M.r :  ?t D, pcr.
The implication is that the sequence  of transfer payments  is determined  by the sequence  of fiatmoney, the sequenc€  of reserve  requirement  ratios, and, implicitly,  the sequence  of prices.  Money
carried over from date t-l  purchases  1/p,  units of the date  t consumption  good.  Hence,  t}re  gross  rate
of return on fiat money is p,_,/p,. Throughout  this paper, assume  A  +  (1-6) )  p,_,/p.
The demand  for money represented  in equation  (7) characterizes  one  part of the bank's asset
allocation  decision. Because  money is rate-of-retum  dominated,  the bank will  invest all deposits
above  the required amount  in capital; that is, K  =  (1-7)D,.  The retum to the bank's portfolio (and
hence,  to depositors)  is represented  as:
(8)
R, = (r-"y.) [A+(1-6)]  * ?.-*-'  ,
Et
where  At(1-6)  is the gross  retum on capital after replacement,  and p,_,/p,  is the gross  return on fiat
money  balances. The retum on deposits  is simply a weighted  average  of the returns to the two assets
held by banks, with the weight being a function of the reserve  requirement  ratio.  With pr,r/pr  <
A+(1-6)  (rate of return dominance),  equation  (8) implies that the retum offered by banks  is inversely
related  to changes  in the reserve  requirement  ratio.
The  representative  person's  first-order  condition  implies  that  output,  deposits,  and
consumption  grow at the rate pt between  dates  t-l  and t.  This growth rate is expressed  as
(9)
pr = (BRt)  Llo  = (P  t(1-?r)A+(1-d)*1.Pj-'11tro.
Llt
Equation  (9) implies that the economy's  growth rate is inversely  related  to the rese?ve  requirement
ratio. David  Romer  (1985)  and  Scott  Freeman  (1987)  show  how reserve  requirements  could  crowd
out capital.  Their results, however, apply to the effect changes  in reserve  requirements  have  on the
level  of output. In the  limit, with -y = 0, monetary  policy  becomes  divorced  from output  growth. As
in Jones  and Manuelli, the absence  of reserve  requirements  means  that the rate of return on capital isindependent  of chenges  in money growth.  Throughout  this paper,  I assume  that 0 >  I and 7  )  0so
that the reserve  requirement  is a binding constraint. Here, the reserve  requirement  ratio affects
capital accumulation  through the gross  return offered by the agent's  portfolio.  The intuition behind
this effect is straightforward. According to the Keynes-Ramsey  rule, a decline  in the retum to the
agent's  portfolio relative to the time rate of preference  increases  current consurrption,  depressing
capital accumulation  and reducing  growth.6
Equation  (9) implies that the economy's  growth rate is inversely related  to the rate of money
growth and, henc€,  to inflation.  Suppose  the supply of money  follows the rule: M, :  dlvl,.,. Using
equation  (7), and recognizing  that Dr+r/Dr :  p, tlen  for a given rate of growth, g =  pr.  ln e$xrtion
(8), constant  money  growth implies that pr-rlp,  =  l/r.  As money  growth rises, the inflation rate rises
and the rate of output growth falls.  The intuition is the same  for an increase  in the reserve
requirement  ratio; higher inflation drives down the return offered on deposits,  making date  t
consumption  more attractive. This result is qualitatively similar to that in earlier papers,  but the
mechanism  is very different.  With a positive reserve  requirement  ratio, higher inflation makes  money
balances  less attractive. Instead  of influencing the intratunporal tradeoff as occurs  in the models  with
a cash-in-advance  constraint,  higher  inflation  results  in a lower  return  on intermediated  capital,
translating  into slower  output  growth. Thus,  the  mechanism  highlights  the  role  that  monetary  policy
actions  have  on intertemporal  substitution.
For a constant  reserve  requirement  ratio and constant  money  growth, output, consumption,
and  deposits  all grow at the  same  fate  across  time; that  is, p = B{(1-,y)tA+(1-d)l'+ ,y0},  where  d is
the constant  growth rate of money.  As King and Rebelo  note, the representative  person  in this model
economy  has  finite utility if and  only if Bp!'" <  l.  This  condition  holds  in all the  experiments
o  Jones  and  Manuelli  (1990)  briefly discuss  the  negative  effect  a decrease  in the (after{ax)  return
has  on output  growth  across  two countries.
t0conducted  in this paper.
3. Monetary Policy and Growth
First, I consider  the quantitative  impact changes  in monetary  policy have  on the growth rate
of the model economy. [n doing so, the results  provide some  measure  of the effect a change  in
monetary  policy will  have  on economic  growth.
3.1 Calibraion
Obviously,  to proceed  one  must  select  a set  of parameter  values. For this analysis,  the
model's period is assumed  to correspond  to one year.  Following King and Rebelo,  the growth rate of
technology  (p, isz%.  Following  Jones  and  Manuelli,  I set  o = 2 and  6 :  0.1.7 For the  inflation
rate,  I use  the  average  increase  in the  fixed-weight  GNP  deflator  over  the 1959:1-1991:3  period,
which  is 4.1%.  As noted  above,  the  rate  of money  growth  is fixed such  that  0 = rp.  Selecting  a
reserve  requirement  ratio for these  experiments  is difhcult because  the reserve  requirement  structure
is nonlinear  for checkable  deposits  and varies  by the type of deposit. To calculate  the average
marginal reserve  requirement  across  time, one would need  data on the type of deposit  and on the size
of the bank in which the deposit  was made. Such  data  are not available. Instead,  I use the reserve
requirement  ratio on personal  demand  deposits  at the  largest  banks  as  a rough  guide. Before  the
eMctment  of the  Depository  Institution  Deregulation  and  Monetary  control Act of 1980  (DIDMCA),
the  reserve  requirement  ratio against  demand  deposits  at the largest  banks  was  16 Ll4%.  After
December  1991,  the reserve  requirement  ratio was  10%. With f0 :  0.1625,  the  gioss  after-reserve-
requirement  return  is 1.048,  so  that  P :  0.9733  :  (1.02/1.048).E
7  As is conventional,  with o :1,  the  momentary  utility is logarithmic.
E  The  parameters  are  consistent  with rate  of return  equal  to 6.5% when  the reserve  requirement
ratio equals  zero. In general,  p =  1.02lR,  where  R is given  by equation  (8).
lt3.2 Monaary  Policy  Actiotu
The  difference  in the rate  of economic  growth  for two different  monetary  policies  is simply
(10)
100+ (p*R1)  1/d  -  100  * (B*Ro1rr" ,
where R,  i  :  0,1 denoting  the return on deposits  under the baseline  monetary  policy action (0) and
the new monetary  policy action (1).
Figure I plots the rate of economic  growth for different values  of the reserve  requirement
ratio with a constant  inflation rate.  For this experiment,  the constant  rate of money growth is set so
that the inflation rate equals  4.1%.  The plot depicts  combinations  of the new reserve  requirement  (1r)
ratio and the change  in the rate of output growth for the case  in which the initial reserve  requirement
(70)  ratio is L6 114%  and inflation is held constant. For example,  lowering the reserve  requirement
ftom 16 ll4% to 0% adds  slightly  more  than  0.9 percentage  points  to the  growth  rate  compared  with
what it would have  been  if no change  to reserye  requirements  were implemented. Presently,  the
reserve  requirement  ratio is lO%  .  Lett\ng  Z' :  0.  10,  Figure  I shows  that  output  growth  is nearly
0.5 percentage  points  higher. According  to the  benchmark  setting,  the  reductions  in reserve
requirements  dictated  by DIDMCA added  roughly  7/2 percentage  point to the  rate  of growth.
Figure  2 plots  the  change  in the  growth  for a money  growth  flrm inflation  rate  experiment.
Specifically,  consider  a case  in which  the initial inflarion  rare  (r0) is 10%. The  plot is a combination
of the  change  in the  growth  rate  of output  and  the  new  inflation  rate  (r'),  For this.  experiment,  the
reserve  requirement  ratio is 10%. Eliminating  inflation  in this economy  adds  around  0.40  percentage
points  to the rate  of growth. Reducing  the inflation  rate  from lO% to 4%, such  as  in the  Volcker
disinflation,  adds  O.2-percentage  points  to the  growth  rate. Note  that  if the  reserve  requirement  were
higher,  output  growth  would  increase  even  more  for a given  reduction  in the  inflation  rate.
Because  both  money  growth  and  reserve  requirements  jointly affect  the return  to deposits,  thequestion  arises  as to how much of the growth-rate  effect depends  on the setting  for the other monetary
policy instrument. The retum to deposits  is inversely related  to changes  in both reserve  requirements
and the inflation rate.  The cross-partial  of the retum is positive, indicating that, for a given reduction
in reserve  requirements,  the size of the growth-rate  effect is larger as  the inflation rate increases.
Figure 3 plots combination  of the change  in the growth rate and the value of the constant  inflation
rate for the case  in which the reserve  requirernent  ratio is reduced  from 16 lt4% to l0%.  As Figure
3 indicates,  the growth rate effect is smaller as the inflation rate is lower.  For example,  reducing  the
reserve  requirement  with a constant  l0%  inflation adds  slightly less  than 1 percentage  point to
growth.  For the case  in which the constant  inflation rate is set equal  to zero, the mte of output
growth rises by only a 0.2 percentage  point for the given reduction  in reserve  requirements, The
intuition behind  this result is straightforward. A reduction  in reserve  requirements  affects  the growth
rate of ouput based  on the spread  between  returns  to capital and retums to money. For a given
reduction  in the reserve  requirement  ratio, the larger the spread  between  intermediated  capital and fiat
money, the larger the gain to the return on deposits. Though not presented  here, a similar argument
holds for a given change  in the inflation rate on growth and the size of the reserve  requirement  ratio.
For a given decrease  in money  growth, the effect on output growth increases  as the resewe
requirement  ratio is larger. Basically,  the  increase  in the return  to money  is passed  through  more
completely  when  the  reserve  requirement  ratio is high. The  implication  is that  for low reserve
requirement  economies,  changing  the inflation rate has  muted growth-rate  effects.
Overall,  monetary  policy actions  have  relatively  large  effects  on output  growlh,  especially  in
light of the  growth-rate  effects  estimated  for economies  in which  other  distortions  or increasing
returns  are  present.  lndeed,  the  growth  rate  effects  are  perhaps  too large  to be  believable.e  Since
e  Gomme  presents  a simple  histogram  with the  contemporaneous  correlation  between  inflation  and
output  growth  for 82 countries.  The  highest  frequency  is at -0-3  and  -0.4.
-tJmonetary  policy operates  through the intertemporal  substitution,  I consider  alternative  values  of the
elasticity of substitution  to determine  how sensitive  the results  are to changes  in this parameter.
Table 1 reports  the increase  in the rate of output growth for three specific monetary  policy
actions  and three  different values  of the elasticity of substitution  parameter. The particular monetary
policy experiments  are listed as row headings. In addition to the setting with o :  2 (the setting
chosen  by Jones  and Manuelli), I examine  the case  with logarithmic utility  and with o =  5.  In each
monetary  policy experiment,  the growth-rate  effect declines  as the elasticity of substitution, i.e.,  l!o,
is decreased.  For example,  in the case  in which o :  5, if the monetary  authority lowers the reserve
requirement  ftom 16 7/4%  to lO%, the  rate  of growth  increases  by 0.  19  percentage  points.
Similarly,  if the  inllation  rate  falls from l0% to 0%, output  growth  increases  by 0.17  percentage
points.  We also estirnate  the effects  with logarithmic utility.  But the estimates  with o :  2 are at the
upper bound of estimated  growth-rate  effects  then the estimates  with logarithmic utility  are too large
to be empirically relevant. Even with the elasticity of substitution  equal  to two, the growth-rate
effects  are  quite  large. In the rest  ofthis paper,  Iwilluse  o =2and  o = 5 to calculate  welfare  costs
and the effects  on seignorage  revenue.
4. Welfare Effects
Another issue  is, What effect do changes  in the monetary  policy instruments  have  on the
welfare of the representative  agent? This question  is raised  by Cooley and Hansen  in a stationary
model  economy. In Cooley  and  Hansen,  the  loss  of seignorage  revenue  meant  th.it  other  distortionary
taxes  might have  to be raised  to maintain the same  path of government  transfers. Cooley and Hansen
report  that  a 10%  inflation  rate  costs  about  0.15  percent  of consumption.  In an  endogenous  growth
model, Jones  and Manuelli find welfare costs  somewhat  larger than those  reported  in cooley and
Hansen,  but Gomme  reports  a welfare  gain  roughly  l/l0th the  size  of these  estimates.
t4Here, two separate  policy experiments  are considered;  one asks  how welfare rcsponds  to a
reduction  in the reserve  requirement  ratio, and the other examines  the effect of a reduction  in the
inflation rate.  More specifically, what happens  to welfare when  (a) the reserve  requirement  ratio falls
ftom 16 ll4% to 10%  and  ft)  the  inflation  rate  falls ftom lO%  to O%.
The measure  of welfare requires  compadson  of the sequences  of consumption  under the
altemative  policies.  Irt  {cl}]=,  denote  the sequence  of consumption  when the policy instrument  is set
equal  to baseline  value and let {cl}]_,  be the sequence  of consumption  under  the new policy setting.
when the reserve  requirement  is 10%.  Then the calculation  is
(11) u({c$(1+{)*-,)  :  u({cl}i=,).
Then d measures  the percentage-change  in consumption  that would be necessary  to make  the agent
just as well off in the baseline  policy setting  as in the new policy setting. To simulate  the
consumption  path, a special  case  of the model is established  in which the initial capital stock, Iq,  is
set  equal  to 1.  As with Cooley  and  Hansen,  welfare  is measure  as  d.
For the first experiment,  the baseline  reserve  requirement  ratio ("f9 is set equal  to 16 114%
and  is compared  with the  outcomes  in which  the  reserve  requirement  is set  equal  to 10%  (11). Money
growth  in this case  is set  so  that  the inflation  rate  equals  4.1%. Table  2 reports  the  effects  that  a
lower reserve  requirement  has  on initial consumption,  the rate  of growth, and welfare for the three
different  values  of the  elasticity  of substitution.  In each  case,  initial consumption  falls in response  to
a lower  reserve  requirement.  To accumulate  more  capital,  the  agent  forgoes  consumption  initially in
response  to the  higher  retum  on deposits  offered  by competitive  banls in the low rbserve  requirement
setting. For these  parameter  settings,  initial consumption  falls  about  9%.  Meanwhile,  the  growth
rate  of output  (and  consumption)  is slightly  more  than  0.4 percentage  points  higher  with yr :  0.10
than  it would  have  been  with "y0  :  0.1625  when  period  utility functions  are  logarithmic. With higher
values  for o, the  welfare  effects  are  muted,  as  are  the  growth  rate  effects  and  loss  of initial
15consumption. The estimates  indicate  that consumption  would have  to be 7.6 percentage  points higher
for the  agent  to be  as  well off with "yo  :  O.t625  as  with 1r :  0.10 and  logarithmic  utility, but only
0.6 percent  greater  for the case  with o :  5.
Table 3 reports the welfare gains achieved  for a case  in which the money  growth is lowered
so  that  the  inllation  rate  falls from lO% to 0%.  The  reserve  requirement  ratio  is 10%  in this
experiment. With o :  2, the welfare costs  of 10% inflation are 3.4% of consumption. As an
additional  experiment,  I computed  the welfare costs  with the same  parameter  values,  except  the
reserve  requirement  ratio is set ^t 16 ll4% .  In this setting, the welfare costs  jump to 65%  of
consumption.ro  With o :  5, the welfare costs  of the moderate  inflation is 0.7% of consumption.
Using the sdne pa.rameter  values,  the welfare costs  of inflation are about seven  times the estimates
obtained  with a nominal depreciation  allowance  distortion and  more than twenty times the estinutes in
a stationary  economy. With lower values  for the elasticity of subsdnrtion,  the growth-rate  effects  are
closer to correlations  found in the data and the welfare costs  of a 10% inflation are quite similar to
estimates  presented  using a nominal depreciation  allowance. The implication is that the existence  of
resewe  requirements  produces  a moderately  larger distortion for monetary  policy than if monetary
policy actions  operate  through money  illusion distortions in the tax code.
5. Seiglorage Revenue
In this set of experiments,  I ask whether  changes  lowering either reserve  requirements  or the
inflation  rate  will generate  enough  growth  so  that  the  same  sequence  of govemmei expenditures  can
be financed. The answer  to this question  says  something  about  seignorage  revenue  but also ensures
10  Asye  imrohorollu and  Edward  Prescott  (1991)  estimate  the  size  of the  welfare  costs  of inflation
in a stationary  economy  with reserve  requirements.  Their estimates  are  between  O.5Vo  and  l.O% of
coNumption with reserve  requirement  ranging from 49% ao l0O%.  This yields a rough measure  of
the importance  that  the  growth-rate  effects  have  in calculating  the  welfare  costs  of inflation.
16that the welfare compadsons  made  above  are indeed  comparable. This is essentially  the same
question  asked  by Ireland (1994) regarding  the effects  of a change  in the income  tax rate.  The issues
arc essentially  the same;  lowering either the inflation rate or reserve  requirements  lowers the tax rate.
As shown  above,  the tax base  is expanding  at a faster rate.  The question,  therefore, is in the spirit of
a present-value  Laffer curve.
The model needs  to be specified  more fully for these  exercises. As equation  (4) specifies,  the
only source  of funds is seignorage  revenue. Later, I also consider  the effects  on present-value
revenue  when an income  tax is present. Lastly, I introduc€  unintermediated  capital into the model.
I assume  that the growth rate of govemment  expenditures  is determined  by the growth rate of
the economy. Here, the question  is whether  the government  can fund the same  sequence  of
expenditures  under lower reserve  requirement  or slower money  growth.  In other words, can  the
government  lower reserve  requirement  ratios or the rate of money  growth and still balance  the
present-value  budget  constraint  without raising reserve  requirement  or money growth in the future?
The first step  is to characterize  the present  value of the governrnent  budget  constraint' With
govemment  expenditures  growing at the same  rate as the economy,  the ratio of government  spending
to output will  remain constant. Let c  :  G,/Y"  Then the date t value of government  expenditures
can  be written as
(r2)
". 
= ou[c  t  (  1-1)  (A+1-6,  . 
*, ]""  .
substituting  the money  supply  rule into equation  (4) yields  the following  expression  for date  t
govemment  budget  constraint  :
(13)
(0  -L)  ''(+  = 
"ulO  r  (1-y)  (A+1-a)  .1r1""  .
Further  substitution  using  the  bank's  asset  allocation  condition  gives  the  date  t budget  constraint  as  afunction of reserve  requirements  and the inllation rate; that is,
(13')
I!0-!l o.  =  oulp  t(1-y)  (A+1-6)  *111""  .
(r-Yl  ?r  -  L  It  J
From equation  (13'), it is straightforward  to shove  that real seignorage  revenue  (the right-hand side) is
positively related  to the reserve  requirement  ratio and money  growth.  Next, summing  over all the
dates,  the present  value of the government  budget  constraint  is represented  as:rr
(14)
i  t*l-.  [r (0-r)  *- - ^  I
A  "''  Llfu  ?T"t  "'J  '
The next step  is to characterize  the change  in the present-value  budget  constraint  for a given
change  in a monetary  policy instrument. For example,  let the "high" reserve  requirement  ratio be ?0,
while the "low" reserve  requirement  ratio is,yr.  Over an infinite horizon, the goverrunent's  prcsent-
value  budget constraint  is zero.  In equation  (12), substitute  for G,, letting ? =  ?0  be the reserve
requirement  ratio.  Set T :  ?r as the revenue  path under the lower resewe  requirement  ratio.
Finally, substitute  "y =  tt  and r  :  porp,-,  into equation  (8) to obtain the discount  factor.  With Iq  =
1, the govemment  can fund the same  sequence  of transfers  if and only if
(15) 
-  ilj2(  1'. K, -  , "t'"  =,  K,)l Dl+#l=' t=oLl
With K  :  P(l1XA+  l-6) -l  7lr'!!", one  can  see  that  changes  in the  monetary  authority's
instruments  can  affect  the  present-value  budget  constraint  through  three  charnels. First, the
selgnorage  revenue  rate  is positively  related  to changes  in reserve  requirements  and  money  growth.
11  Government  borrowing  is not considered  in this setup. One  include  government  borrowing  into
the model with the appropriate  terminal condition.  A no-Ponzi  condition assumption  guarantees  that
the infinite horizon government  budget  constraint  can be written and does  not quantitatively  alter the
results.
l8Second,  the path of capital accumulation  is inversely related  to changes  in reserve  requirement  ratios
and money  growth.  The Laffer curve-type  tension  present  in this numerical  exercise  is whether  the
tax-rate  effect or the tax-base  effect dominates. Third, the reduction  in the reserve  requirement  ratio
raises  the return on deposits  and thus decreases  the present  value of the government's  future receipts
and  expenditures.
With R >  1, equation  (15)  can  be  further  simplified,  written  as
(16)
where  nl :  (0-l).r,r/(l-zrh-,  n0  :  (O-t)/i(1-lgn,  Rt -  (l-?tXA+ t-6) *  7rla-,  and  Ro  :  (t-
?9(A+  1-6) f  flr.  Because  this monetary  policy instrument  has an ambiguous  effect on pVBC, the
next step  is to apply numerical  techniques  to calculate  the present-value  budget  constraint;  that is, can
the  same  sequence  of transfer  paymenB  be financed  with a lower  reserve  requirement  ratio,  using
reasonable  parameter  value.s?
5.1 Econamies  rvith only Seignorage  Revenue
The first experiment  is to examine  the effect a change  in the reserve  requirement  ratio has  on
the  present-value  budget  constraint  [equation  (15)]. Figure  4 plots  the  combination  of PVBC  and  the
new  reserve  requirement  ratio,  7r.  The  initial reserve  requirement  ratio is /  = 0.1625. Money
growth  is set  so  that  the inflation  rate  in these  experiments  is set  equal  to 4.1%.  In addtion,  o :  5 so
that  the  growth-rate  effects  used  are  the  more  conservative  ones. With 7 :  0.1625,  the  ratio  of
seignorage  revenue  to output  is about  7  % at date  t:  1, nearly  three  times  the  steady-state  values  for
the  seignorage-output  ratio estimated  in imrohorollu and  prescott  (1991).t?  of course,  seignorage
revenue  is the  only source  of revenue  in this  version  of the  model. As Figure  4 shows,  pvBC is
r2  with the inflation  rate  equal  to 10%  and  the  reserve  requirement  ratio  equal  16 ll4%,  the  tax
rate  on capital  is 2.2%  .  Wiah  the  reserve  requirement  set  at 10Vo  and  inflation  at 4%  . Lhe  tax  l?ite
falls  to 0.65  %  .
19negative  for all values  of the reserve  requirement  ratio considered. Hence, lowering the reserve
requirement  ftom 16 ll4%  to !0%,  as the Federal  Reserve  has  done since  the 1980s,  results  in a
sequenc€  of seignorage  revenue  that is smaller than what rvould have  been  funded if the reserve
requirement  ratio were left unchanged.
Next, consider  the effect of a change  in money  growth.  For this, equation  (16) is altered,
withnl :  (0-l)t/Qthrt,1o  :1d-1)7/(11)r0, Rr :  (lrXA+1-6)  *  /a'r, andR0  = (1-rXA+1-6)
*  "y/a'0,  where ar is the initial inflation rate, and rr  is the new inflation rate.  The value  of reserve
requirements  used  in these  experiments  is 16 ll4%  and a =  5.  Figure 5 plots combinations  of PVBC
and  the  new  inllation  rate,  a'r. The  initial value  of the inflation  rate  is 10%,  or d  =  1.10. As the
plot shows  , PVBC is negative  at all values  of rr .  In this model economy,  lowering the inflation rate
results  in a decline in the present  value of seignorage  revenue. This result is consistent  with Cooley
and Haruen.  So even  with the faster mte of output growth, the reduction  in the tax rate  dominates
the present-value  calculation  of the change  in seignorage  revenue.
Overall, the evidence  suggests  that, with only seignorage  revenue  as  the source,  lowering
reserve  requirements  or money  growth would result in a revenue  shortfall such  that balancing  the
budget  would require a smaller sequence  of government  expenditures. These  estimates  are consistent
with the Cooley and Hansen  result in that a lower inflation rate would require increases  in other
distortionary taxes  to maintain the same  path for government  expenditures.
5.2 Economies  with seignorage  and income  taxes
Consider  one  modification  to the  model  to include  an income  tax rate.  denoted  r.  The  date  t
budget  constraint  is
(17)
and  with constant  money  growth  and  resewe  requirement  ratios,  the  return  to deposits  is
20(18) q  =  (1-z)A + (1-d)l(1-"y)  + "y/r.
After substituting  for the retum on deposits  and  the date  t budget  constraint  into the present-value
budget  constraint,  the  expression  looks  like PVBC  in equation  (16),  with the  values  of
nr=  rA  + (0-l)lr  * 7tl(l-?t), n0  = rA  + (l-L)tr  * rol(1rr9.  Further,.yr  and  /  are  substituted
into Rt and Ro, respectively.
Figure 6 plots the combination  of the change  in PVBC and the new reserve  re4uirement  ratio.
The initial reserve  requirement  ratio is 16 ll4%  for these  experiments. In this case,  the change  in
PVBC is negative  for every value of the reserve  requirement  ratio considered. Figure 7 plots the
combination  of the change  in PVBC and the rate of inflation.  The initial policy sets  the inflation rate
at l0%.  As with the reserve  requirement  experiments,  a decline  in the inflation rate is not enough  to
offset the reduction in the tax rate.
In both cases,  monetary  policy has  virtually no impact  on output growth for the parameter
settings  chosen. Because  the growth rate effects  are small, the decline in the tax rate more than
offsets  the increase  in the tax base. To demonstrate  how sensitive  PVBC is to the size of the growth
rale effect, consider  the reserve  requirement  and money  growth experiments  with an income  tax
presentarldo:2.
Panels  (a) and (b) in Figure 8 redo the reserve  requirement  and inflation rate experiments,
respectively,  setting  d = 2.  In both  monetary  policy experiments,  the  change  in PVBC is positive  for
small to moderate  movements  in the monetary  policy parameters. The implication is that small
changes  in the tax rate  result  in sufficient  growth  in the  tax  base  to increase  the  present  value  of total
revenue.  However,  the  figures  are  also  telling  in that  relatively  large  changes  in the  monetary  policy
variables  fail to generate  enough  growth  in the  tax  base  to raise  the  present  value  of total  revenues.
For example,  the  effect  on PVBC is different  for the  two policies;  lowering  reserve  requirements
from 16 l/4% to l0% would  result  in PVBC <  0. but lowerine  the  inflarion  rate  from lO%  to 4%
2lwould  result  in PVBC >  0.
The effect that monetary  policy actions  have  on the government's  present-value  budget
constraint  depend  on the potency  (in terrns of impact on the growth rate) of the policy action.  If the
growth-mte effects  are negligible, seignorage  revenue  falls in response  to a lower inflation rate and
lower reserve  requirementE.  Moreover, total revenue  also falls.  However, if the elasticity of
substitution  is smaller, monetary  policy actions  have  larger growth-rate  effects, and small changes  in
the inflation rate or reserve  requirements  result in a higher present  value for total revenues  in this
model economy.
5,3 Economies  with unintermediated  capital
In this section,  I relax the assumption  that all capital is intermediated. This modification does
not affect the growth-rate  effects  but appropriately  limits the tax base  to that portion of the capital
stock that is financed  by banks. This approach  addresses  the size of seignorage  revenue  relative to
income. The question,  therefore,  is, What happens  to total tax revenues  if the taxing powers  of the
monetary  authority are limited to intermediated  capital? The basic issue  is still the same-the tradeoff
between  the tax rate and tax base. Both the tax rate and tax base  shrink in this modified version. but
the rate of the tax base  is not affected.
To obtain  the  distribution  of savings  between  intermediated  and  unintermediated  capital,  the
arbitrage  condition  requires  that  the returns  be equal. Unintermediated  capital  is not subject  to a
reserve  requirement  ratio but has  a diminishing marginal  product.  Let the technology  transforming
unintermediated  capital  into consumption  goods  be
B  (K') 
"
where  Ku  denotes  the  stock  of unintermediated  capital. With population  constant,  this is a Cobb-
Douglas  production  technology.  For this computational  experiment,  ir is necessary  to quantify  the
22initial stock of unintermediated  and intermediated  capital.  In period 0, let the sum of the two types  of
capital  be  equal  to 1. Then  arbitrage  condition  can  be  used  to solve  for the initial stock  of
unintermediated  capital. Formally,
(19)
(1-r) t{1-r)A+(1-0)l = o(1_z)A(Ku).'-1 + (1_6)
Using equation  (19) to solve for K", the $tock  of intermediated  capital is simply l-IC.
For t}le cornputational  experiment,  B :  0.35 and o  :  0.35.  All  other values  are equal  to
their baseline  values  and o :  5.  For this case,  the ratio of seignorage  revenue  to output is 0.009%
and the ratio of the initial stock of intermediated  capital to total capital is 27% of the total capital
stock.  Figure 9 then calculates  the change  in PVBC for the two alternative  poliry  actions. The
gro\lth rate of consumption,  deposits,  and  output is unaffected  by introducing unintermediated
capital.r3 Panel  (a) plots the outcomes  of the reserve  requirement  experiments;  that is, the
combination  of the change  in PVBC and the new reserve  requirement  ratio when original policy value
is 10 :  6.1625. Panel  (a)  shows  that  the  PVBC is positive  at every  value  so  that  lowering  teserve
requirements  results  in larger present  value for revenues. Panel  @) plots the PVBC for the inflation
rate  experiments  in which  the  original  policy is setting  money  growth  such  that  the inflation  rate  is
lO%.  Again,  PVBC is positive  for every  decrease  in the inflation  rate  considered.
Thus,  the  present  value  of government  revenues  rises  in response  to lower  inflation  rates  and
lower  reserve  requirements.  Despite  the  lower tax  rates,  the  model  economy  with unintermediated
13  The  return  to capital  with a linear  production  function  does  not depend  on the  quantity  of
capital. Consequently,  a growing  capital  stock  does  not affect  return  to intermediated  capital  as  it
does  unintermediated  capital. The  upshot  is that  as  1-  o,  then  K(K+  K") .- l.  One  could  make  a
policy action  neutral  with respect  to the  ratio of intermediated  capital  to total  capital  by letting  the
technological  constant  grow at the  same  rate  as  intermediated  capital. The  growth  rate  of
intermediated  capital  would  not be  affected  by technology-driven  growth  in the  unintermediated
sector. Thus,  the  path  for seignorage  revenue  in these  experiments  would  be  unaffected  by
maintaining  a constant  ratio  for K/(K+Ku).
+-]' 'tland intermediated  capital grows enough  to offset the lower rates. In this case,  seignorage  revenue  is
just such  a small fraction of total taxes  that altering the rates  has  virtually no effects  on the overall tax
rate. Consequently,  the  policy actions  considered  result  in faster,  albeit  small,  growth  so that  tax
revenues  rise.
The main result of this section  is that economies  in which seignorage  revenue  is a small
fraction of total revenues  can generate  more revenue  by choosing  a lower inflation rate or lower
reserve  requirement. In addition, the results  indicate  that the same  sequence  of government
expenditures  can be financed  by lowering either monetary  policy instrument. This finding validates
the welfare estimates  presented  earlier.  Moreover, the evidence  suggests  that it is not necessary  to
raise income  taxes  to offset lower seignorage  taxes  in a growing economy.
6. Sumrnary
In this paper, a simple general  equilibrium model with endogenous  growth is used  to examine
the effects  of monetary  policy on the growth rate.  In this setup,  savers  are forced to use  banks
because  capital is illiquid  in the sense  that there  is a minimum size restriction on an investmenr
project. In general,  reduced  money  growth  (lower  inflation)  and/or  lower  reserve  requirements  result
in increased  output growth because  the return on deposits  is increased. The model is similar to other
endogenous  growth models  used  to examine  the role of monetary  policy except  in one important
respect.  In this model  economy,  a reserve  requirement  distortion  is introduced  so that  monetary
policy actions  affect  the  return  on intermediated  capital  directly. This direct  effect  also  translates  into
larger  growth-rate  effects  and  more  substantial  welfare  gains. In short,  the  marginal  effect  that
monetary  policy actions  have  on the return to capital means  that monetary  policy is moderately  more
powerful  as  a tool to influence  growth  and  welfare.
In computational  experiments,  the  estimates  of growth-rate  and  welfare  effects  generated
24under conventional  parameter  settings  are large.  With a relatively small elasticity of substitution
parameter,  the growth-rate  and welfare effects  are smaller, but the welfare cost of inflation is still
quite large compared  with earlier estimates.
What these  fndings demonstrate  is how monet4ry  policy actions  affect the economy  when
they affect the choices  between  consumption  today and consumption  tomorrow.  The reserve
requirement  is a distortion that affects  these  choices. Because  reserve  requirements  are so prevalent
across  the world, this distortion makes  this mechanism  empirically relevant  and thus worthy of
examination. The results  from the computationd experiments  indicate  that reserve  requirements  are a
bigger distortion than other distortions considered  in this literature, in the sense  that changes  in
monetary  policy have  relatively large effects  under "normal" parameter  settings. Several  questiors
are raised  by this research. Of course,  one question  involves the transition dyanmics,  which are
excluded  in this setup. Another  issue  is the  primitive  money  demand  specificatio.  If people  held
money  as  a savings  vehicle,  a "Tobin  effect' would  be  present.  A higher  inflation  rate  would  result
in some  substitution  between  money  in its saving  role to capital,  thus  muting  the  monetary  policy
effects. In addition,  the  absence  of uncertainty  means  that  information  problems  are  not taken
seriously  into consideration.  Lastly,  this setup  does  not permit  a characterization  of
dinintermediation. It would interesting  to study the effect that change  in the inflation rate would have
bank  financing  versus  direcr  financing.
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